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Shachmurove: Contesting Deposition Locations

A QUIXOTIC QUEST OVER BEFOGGED TERRAIN?
HOW TO CHOOSE AND CONTEST A DEPOSITION’S LOCATION
UNDER FEDERAL PROCEDURAL LAW
Amir Shachmurove*

ABSTRACT
Rather than something extraordinary, this article strives to provide
something ordinary—a rough map, an assured but imperfect sketch—
sorely needed by practitioners yet strangely missing from modern
commentary, scholarly and otherwise. In less than 10,000 words, it
summarizes the presumptions, precedents, and provisions applicable to
a court’s decision regarding the proper location of a deposition under
federal law, whether embodied in explicit text or conveyed in often
qualified prose. As it shows, in making these fact-specific
determinations over the last fifty years, this nation’s federal courts have
mined a default presumption from Rule 30, focused their energies on
Rule 26, and crafted two more tenets and at least two substantially
identical, and increasingly narrowed, tests. Indubitably, these ad hoc
analyses have engendered a perplexing and contradictory body of law.
Yet, in the midst of this jarring cacophony, directions for the busy can
be imparted, and checklists adumbrated. In an era of transnational
defendants and cross-border cases, even such tentative directions can
aid the pressured and puzzled.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Crafted by men focused on the loosening of the common law’s
stultifying formalism,1 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”
collectively, and “Rule” individually) say little about the proper location
for a deposition of a person, whether a citizen or non-citizen and
whether living in or out of the United States. Rule 30 plainly allows a
party to “by oral questions, depose any person, including a party,
without leave of court except as provided in Rule 30(a)(2),”2 but nothing
as to any such querying’s setting appears in this provision, the Rules’
fifth title, or the Rules as a whole. Like purest nature, though, few
federal courts3 can tolerate a vacuum and stomach taciturnity’s
perpetration; even if so inclined, not even the most artful can always
evade a case and controversy merely by a confession of bemusement or
befuddlement. Due to the inevitable byproduct of this process—too
much imperfect precedent and too many inconsistent holdings—those
searching for guidance concerning this fraught issue face the near
certainty of cumbersome exegeses of haphazard dogmas and false
doctrinal leads, ones likely to yield, with only a few exceptions, mostly
questionable conclusions.
Nonetheless, some definite instructions can be mined from this
muddled jurisprudence, as this brief article—and its appendix—dare to
delineate. If only tentatively, a relatively stable atlas, a virtue so crucial
for the preservation of hoary equity, 4 can be sketched, a protean reality
familiar to the seafarers of yesteryear. At minimum, it is more than what
has formerly existed, providing a bit of the predictability and certainty
so crucial to the reasoned exercise of even the most generous bequest of
procedural discretion.

* Amir Shachmurove is an associate at Troutman Sanders LLP who can always be reached at
ashachmurove@post.harvard.edu. He dedicates this article, more practical and less academic than his
usual fare due partly to a diligent group of student editors, to the wisest and warmest of colleagues:
Alonso J. Cisneros, Bryanna R. Rainwater, Erin O’Neil Ashby, Kelly Mufarrige, S.R. Sidarth, and
Valarie J. Livengood. As always, of course, all the views expressed, and mistakes made herein, are the
author’s own, and this article is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.
1. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 924–25 (1987).
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1).
3. Unless otherwise noted, any reference to “court” or “courts” is to one or more United States
district courts or courts of appeals. If capitalized, however, the term “Court” refers to the United States
Supreme Court in accordance with The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation.
4. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Toward a Practical Definition of the Rule of Law, 46 JUDGES J. 4, 5
(2007) (characterizing openness and stability as the essential predicates for the rule of law).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss4/2

2

Shachmurove: Contesting Deposition Locations

2019]

CONTESTING DEPOSITION LOCATIONS

947

II. LEGAL SURVEY: IDENTIFYING RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND
PRECEDENTS
As originally written and as subsequently amended, the Rules evince
a maddening silence with regard to the choice of a deposition’s location,
particularly as to depositions governed by Rule 30(a)(1) and Rule
30(b)(6).5 Unsurprisingly, “a confusing, and sometimes inconsistent,
line of caselaw” has festered due to this willful reticence.6 This mostly
accurate declamation, however, neglects the lighthouses—not strikingly
luminous yet incontestably real—dotting this anarchic landscape. Over
the last five decades, with only occasional inconsistencies, sundry courts
have extracted a default presumption from Rule 30, made much of Rule
26, and formulated two more tenets and at least two substantially
identical tests, tapering their analytical focus to two factors: (1) whether
the deponent is an individual party or a representative of an
organization, and (2) whether the party is a plaintiff or defendant. In that
tense period in which lawyers debate a deposition’s location, it is these
seemingly settled, but variable, patterns and prevalent, yet contested,
notions with which every lawyer must be conversant.
A. Extrinsic Sources: Universal Precepts
Apart from the texts, two verities influence the judiciary’s application
of these nebulous touchstones. Relevant to even the most specific
provision’s explication, courts tend to view the Rules as “an integrated
whole.”7 Consequently, in courts’ reckoning, the discovery rules amount
to “an integrated mechanism to be read in pari materia.”8 One rule’s
construction, in other words, must be consistent not just with its explicit
text but the Rules in toto.9 Furthermore, the Rules’ “depositiondiscovery regime” has always been seen as “an extremely permissive
one,” overwhelmingly tilted in favor of minimally reasonable
5. See, e.g., SEC v. Banc de Binary, No. 2:13-CV-993-RCJ-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34373, at *8, 2014 WL 1030862, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 14, 2014); Arabi Gin Co. v. Plexus Cotton, Ltd.
(In re Joseph Walker & Co.), 472 B.R. 696, 699–700 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012); In re Outsidewall Tire
Litig., 267 F.R.D. 466, 470–71 (E.D. Va. 2010).
6. Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Location of Party-Depositions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 37
RES GESTAE 358 (Feb. 1994).
7. Garza v. Webb Cty., 296 F.R.D. 511, 512 (S.D. Tex. 2014); see also, e.g., Cipollone v.
Liggett Grp., Inc., 822 F.2d 335, 342 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting with approval Cipollone v. Liggett Grp.,
Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 92–93 (D.N.J. (1986)).
8. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc. v. Furniture USA, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 255, 258 (M.D.N.C.
2001); see also Mortg. Info. Servs. v. Kitchens, 210 F.R.D. 562, 566–67 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (noting that
“the traditional canons of interpretation regarding the interaction between the various Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure . . . require that the rules be construed in a manner that is internally consistent”).
9. Amir Shachmurove, Purchasing Claims and Changing Votes: Establishing “Cause” under
Rule 3018(a), 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 511, 532 (2015).
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discovery.10 As one court aptly observed, the Rules’ design and spirit
compel “a broad and liberal treatment” so as to allow parties to “refine
the case and . . . prepare it for trial based on a full understanding of the
relevant facts.”11 In spite of recent precedent and amendments in tension
with this forgiving penchant, this longstanding ideal endures.12 Acting
concurrently, this vision of the Rules in general and Title V in particular
as an integrated series of commands to be construed, by default, so as to
enhance the uncovering and winnowing of facts influence the federal
courts’ approach to the determination of a deposition’s appropriate
locale whenever a deponent challenges another’s initially unfettered
choice.
B. Written Laws
1. Depositions Generally: Rule 30’s Implicit and Explicit Restrictions
Since Title V’s limited rearrangement in 1970, Rule 30 has controlled
the conduct of all depositions by oral examination,13 recognizing no
distinction between de bene esse (or trial) and discovery depositions like
some of the Rules’ state analogues.14 Per Rule 30(a)(1), a party may
depose “any person, including a party, without leave of court, except as
provided in Rule 30(a)(2),” and attendance of a deponent, whether a
party or not, “may be compelled by subpoena under Rule 45.”15
Typically, a notice issued by a plaintiff suffices to compel the
attendance of a party at a deposition.16 Rule 30(a)(2) requires judicial
permission in only four separate instances: (1) whenever the parties have
10. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Hechinger Inv. Co. of Delaware, Inc. v. Friedman
(In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman), 350 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Schlagenhauf v.
Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114–15, 85 S. Ct. 234, 241, 13 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1964) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 501, 507, 67 S. Ct. 385, 392, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947) (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 221 F.R.D. 661, 670–71 (D. Kan. 2004) (emphasizing
“the broad and liberal construction afforded by the federal discovery rules”).
11. In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman, 350 F.3d at 69; Arthur R. Miller, Reflections on
the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 353–56 (2013).
12. Amir Shachmurove, Policing Boilerplate: Reckoning and Reforming Rule 34’s Popular—yet
Problematic—Construction, 37 N. Ill. U. L. REV. 203, 212 n.38 (2017).
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 30; Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2009).
14. Chrysler Int’l Corp. v. Chemaly, 280 F.3d 1358, 1362 n.8 (11th Cir. 2002).
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1); see, e.g., Luckey v. Visalia Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:13-cv-00332AWI-SAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179446, at *3, 2014 WL 7409034, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2014);
Peitzman v. City of Illmo, 141 F.2d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 1944).
16. E.g., Bailey v. Connolly (In re Van Vleet), Nos. 08-cv-00506-WYD, 08-cv-01645-WYD,
08-cv-01870-WYD, 08-cv-02109-WYD, 09-cv-00433-WYD, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 953, at *12–13,
2009 WL 3162212, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2009); In re Honda, 106 B.R. 209, 211 (Bankr. D. Haw.
1989); Farquhar v. Shelden, 116 F.R.D. 70, 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Cont’l Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.
Delta Corp. of Am., 71 F.R.D. 697, 699 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
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not stipulated to a deposition and (a) “the deposition would result in
more than 10 depositions being taken under this rule or Rule 31 by the
plaintiffs, or by the defendants, or by the third-party defendants”; (b)
“the deponent has already been deposed in the case;” or (c) “the party
seeks to take the deposition before the time specified in Rule 26(d),
unless the party certifies in the notice, with supporting facts, that the
deponent is expected to leave the United States and be unavailable for
examination in this country after that time; or (2) whenever the deponent
is imprisoned.”17 As Rule 30 implies, in this authorized exercise of
discretion, a court is expected to employ the proportionality test now set
forth in Rule 26(b)(1) and (2)(C) and once encoded in Rule
26(b)(2)(C).18 In essence, via Rule 26, a party can overcome Rule 30’s
presumptive limit by demonstrating any additional depositions’
reasonableness and necessity.19
Rule 30(b) sets forth numerous formal procedural requirements.20 Its
first paragraph specifies what the requisite notice must generally
include.21 Rule 30(b)(6) modifies those prerequisites when either “notice
or subpoena” is directed at “a public or private corporation, a
partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity.”22
Upon receipt of a notice sent pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), “the named
organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or
managing agents, or . . . other persons who consent to testify on its
behalf;” it may even “set out the matters on which each person
designated will testify,” though “a subpoena,” but not a notice, “must
advise a nonparty organization of its duty to make this designation.”23
The person so selected must “testify about information known or
reasonably available to the organization.”24 Despite this sentence’s
seemingly plain meaning, a split of authority has arisen as to when and

17. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2); Smith v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 302 F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.
Fla. 2014).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2); Wertz v. GEA Heat Exchangers Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1991, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 167947, at *5–6, 2015 WL 8959408, at *2–3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2015).
19. See, e.g., Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., No. Civ. A. 03-1519 (AET), 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59095, at *8, 2006 WL 6487632, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2006).
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b); Healthier Choice Flooring, LLC v. CCA Global Partners, Inc., No.
1:11-CV-2504-CAP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193345, at *5–6, 2013 WL 12101905, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan.
4, 2013).
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(1); Mealing v. Ga. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 564 F. App’x 421, 429
(11th Cir. 2014).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6); In re Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 745 F.3d 216, 218 (7th
Cir. 2014).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6); Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 528 F. App’x 96, 103 n.7 (2d Cir.
2013).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6); Gonzalez Prod. Sys. v. Martinrea Int’l Inc., 310 F.R.D. 341, 342–43
(E.D. Mich. 2015).
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how a party can use a Rule 30(b)(6) designee at trial.25 Despite this
debate and its intricacy, Rule 30(b)(6) “does not preclude a deposition
by any other procedure allowed by the [R]ules,”26 and “[t]he parties may
stipulate—or the court may on motion order—that a deposition be taken
by telephone or other remote means.,27 Unsurprisingly, however, the text
itself does not codify a standard for adjudicating the merits of such
accommodations.28
Customarily, and certainly in its early decades, Rule 30(b) has been
and was read to allow the examining party to “unilaterally” choose the
location of the deposition of party and non-party alike.29
2. Deposition by Subpoena: The Problems Presented by Rule 45 and 28
U.S.C. § 1783
If the proposed deponent is not a party and does not consent to attend,
a subpoena is the only alternative under the Rules. In such cases, Rule
45 governs that writ’s service and the deposition’s location.30 True,
“nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly precludes the
use of Rule 45 subpoenas against parties,” including a governmental
entity.31 And when the location of the depositions for a subpoenaed
party engenders dispute, courts only inconsistently invoke its geographic
limitation.32 Regardless of debates over its coverage, whether the target

25. See Estate of Thompson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 291 F.R.D. 297, 303–06 (N.D.
Iowa 2013) (canvassing divide).
26. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 92 n.6 (2d Cir. 2012).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(4); see Marlboro Prod. Corp. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 55 F.R.D. 487,
489 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (concluding that “experimentation with the newly authorized procedure should be
encouraged rather than blocked”), quoted in Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517, 522 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
28. Estate of Gerasimenko v. Cape Wind Trading Co., 272 F.R.D. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
29. SEC v. Banc de Binary, No. 2:13-CV-993-RCJ-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34373, at *8,
2014 WL 1030862, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 14, 2014) (citing 8A WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2112 (2010)); accord, e.g., Cassidy v. Teaching Co., LLC, No. 2:13-CV884, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123413, at *3, 2014 WL 4377843 , at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2014); Lord v.
Flanagan, No. CV 13-26-BU-DLC-JCL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1687, at *3–4, 2014 WL 51655, at *2
(D. Mont. Jan. 7, 2014); DeGeer v. Gillis, No. 09 C 6974, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97457, at *4, 2010
WL 3732132, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2010).
30. Hasbro, Inc. v. Serafino, 168 F.R.D. 99, 100 (D. Mass. 1996); accord, e.g., Renewable Res.
Coalition, Inc. v. Kaplan (In re Robert Leonard Kaplan), No. 2:11-bk-60249-RK, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS
2390, at *5, 2013 WL 2897766, at *1 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 12, 2013). By definition, a “subpoena” is
“a writ or order commanding a person to appear before a court or other tribunal, subject to a penalty for
failing to comply.” Subpoena, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
31. Yousuf v. Samantar, 451 F.3d 248, 256–57 (D.C. Cir. 2006); First City, Tex.-Houston, N.A.
v. Rafidain Bank, 197 F.R.D. 250, 254 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
32. See Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1985)
(deeming the geographic limitations of Rule 45(e) to be equally applicable to parties and non-parties);
Racher v. Lusk, No. CIV-13-665-M, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1160, at *5, 2016 WL 67799, at *2 (W.D.
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is a party or a non-party, “[a] subpoena may be served at any place
within the United States” under Rule 45(b)(2).33 Once served, a failure
to comply may render that recalcitrant person liable for contempt of
court.34 Still, as a practical matter, a subpoena issued upon express order
of a judge and one by a clerk tend to elicit different juridical treatment.35
In short, “[f]acilitating service of process on managing agents of foreign
corporations [or any foreign person] is not a legitimate reason to compel
deponents to appear in . . . [a specific U.S. jurisdiction], as this is not the
function of Rules 30(a)(1) or (b)(6)”; for such situations, “the carefully
crafted procedures of Rule 45” control.36
In contrast, Section 1783 of the twenty-eighth title of the United
States Code (“Code”), also known as the Walsh Act,37 “governs issuing
and serving a subpoena directed to a United States national or resident
who is in a foreign country,”38 classes explicitly broader than the term
“United States citizen.”39 Seemingly, Congress did not intend this
provision to apply in connection with any foreign proceedings.40 Rather,
this statute “was enacted in 1926 in order to compel Americans living
abroad to return to the United States to testify at a trial in a criminal case
[and, after 1964, a civil case], if the testimony was deemed by the court

Okla. Jan. 5, 2016) (noting that the geographic limitation of Rule 45 does not apply to the depositions of
parties).
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(2); Osgood v. Disc. Auto Parts, LLC, 981 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1265 (S.D.
Fla. 2013).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(f)–(g); see also, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Rhb
Installations, Inc., No. CV 12-2981 (JS)(ARL), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4266, at *4, 2016 WL 128153, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2016) (“If a commanded party ‘fails without adequate excuse to obey the
subpoena,’ the court may hold that party in contempt.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 45(g))); Calabro v.
Stone, 224 F.R.D. 532, 533 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Absent an improperly issued subpoena or an ‘adequate
excuse’ by the non-party, failure to comply with a subpoena made under Rule 45 may be deemed a
contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued.”); Daval Steel Prods. v. M/V Fakredine, 951
F.2d 1357, 1364 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] valid subpoena is a legal instrument, non-compliance with which
can constitute contempt of court.”).
35. See Recording Indus. of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc. (In re Verizon Internet Servs.,
Inc.), 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 251 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[I]n the Rule 45 context, courts recognize that a
subpoena issued upon express order of a judge and a subpoena issued by the clerk of the court are not
equivalent.”).
36. In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 267 F.R.D. 466, 474 (E.D. Va. 2010).
37. Act of July 3, 1926, 44 Stat. 83 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 1783); see Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 433–35 n.1, 52 S. Ct. 252, 76 L. Ed. 2d 375 (1932) (discussing this original
version).
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1783. A separate section within the same chapter of the
Code controls discovery from United States residents or those individuals found in the United States for
use in foreign tribunals. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). In this article, any references to “Section 1782” or “§
1782,” and to “Section 1783” or “§ 1783,” are to the sections cited in this footnote, as codified within
the Code’s twenty-eighth title, unless otherwise noted.
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2014).
40. In re Oxus Gold PLC, No. 06-82–GEB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24061, at *25, 2007 WL
1037387, at *9 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007).
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issuing the subpoena to be of sufficient importance.”41 Whatever its
precise purpose, before a court may order the appearance of United
States citizens residing in foreign countries as witnesses in a deposition,
Section 1783 requires that it find (1) “that particular testimony or the
production of the document or other thing by him is necessary in the
interest of justice” and (2) “that it is not possible to obtain his [or her]
testimony in admissible form without his [or her] personal appearance or
to obtain the production of the document or other thing in any other
manner.”42 For all their apparent clarity, much ambiguity enshrouds
these operative criteria as to this “extraordinary subpoena power.”43
The subject of a “surprising shortage of pertinent case law,” the
“interest of justice” prong is normally “considered in light of the
circumstances of the particular case and, more importantly, the posture
of the case when the issue arises.”44 In the eyes of most courts, this bar
is met only upon proof of one or more “compelling reason[s].”45 By no
means binding, and oddly never included within its body, this statute’s
legislative history offers up “a multiple of factors,” 46 including “the
nature of the proceedings, the nature of the testimony or evidence
sought, the convenience of the witness or the producer of the evidence,
the convenience of the parties, and other facts bearing upon the
reasonableness of requiring a person abroad to appear as a witness.” 47 In
fact, some courts have often classified “the predicate theory of federal
pre-trial discovery,” i.e. “the production of relevant material essential
for the full and fair litigation of a cause of action,” as one such pertinent
justification.48 Effectively concocting a quasi-standard, a handful of
courts have held testimony to be “necessary in the interest of justice”
under Section 1783 by virtue of its satisfaction of the liberal relevancy
standard implanted within Rule 26(b).49

41. SEC v. Sabhlok, No. 08 Civ. 4238, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105194, at *13, 2009 WL
3561523, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a); Air Turbine Tech., Inc. v. Atlas Copco AB, 217 F.R.D. 545, 546 (S.D.
Fla. 2003).
43. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 10 (1964).
44. Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 412 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting
Klesch & Co. v. Liberty Media Corp., 217 F.R.D. 517, 523 (D. Colo. 2003)); see also, e.g., In re
Petrobras Secs. Litig., No. 14-cv-9662 (JSR), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30469, at *6–8, 2016 WL 908644,
at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2016) (applying this totality of circumstances test).
45. Ungar, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 333–34(quoting Klesch & Co., 217 F.R.D. at 523); see also Balk
v. N.Y. Inst. of Tech., 974 F. Supp. 2d 147, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying Walsh Act).
46. Ungar, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 334.
47. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 10.
48. Klesch & Co., 217 F.R.D. at 524; see also, e.g., Costello v. Poisella, 291 F.R.D. 224, 230
(N.D. Ill. 2013) (observing that the court’s authority to manage and oversee the discovery process
extends beyond information acquired through formal discovery and allows it to restrict a party’s use of
the Rules’ subpoena provision).
49. See, e.g., SEC v. Sabhlok, No. 08 Civ. 4238, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105194, at *8, 2009 WL
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The second prong, in turn, has been even less frequently explicated.
The few courts forced to assess this second requirement look to whether
the information sought from the relevant witness can be practically
obtained.50 Thus, “[s]ubpoenas may be issued when it is ‘impractical’ to
obtain the information.”51 To some, it can be met by showing that the
deponent offers “a unique source of evidence . . . not previously
provided,”52 or “where resort to alternative methods is unlikely to
produce the relevant evidence in time to meet impending discovery
deadlines.”53 As another court opined, “[i]mpracticality occurs . . .
where resort to alternative methods is unlikely to produce the relevant
evidence in time to meet impending discovery deadlines.”54 Whatever
the standard’s functional denotation, sheer impossibility is not
necessary,55 and “generalized and speculative concern[s]” about possible
“hardship” will never suffice.56
Several limits attach to any subpoena issued pursuant to Rule 45(b)(2)
or (b)(3). Most importantly, such a directive may command a person to
attend a deposition in only two places: (1) “within 100 miles of where
the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in
person,” or (2) “within the state where the person resides, is employed,
or regularly transacts business in person” if that person is either “a party
or a party’s officer” or “is command to attend a trial and would not incur
substantial expense.”57 In practice, Rule 45 compels a court to “quash
any subpoena that calls for a deposition beyond the 100 mile limit for
non-party witness.”58 This atextual construction draws its justification
from Rule 45’s reputed ends: “to protect such witnesses from being
subjected to excessive discovery burdens in litigation in which they have
little or no interest.”59 In addition, the resulting subpoena must be served
3561523, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009) (citing SEC v. Sandifur, No. C05-1631C, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89428, at *11, 2006 WL 3692611, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2006)); cf. Klesch, 217 F.R.D. at
523 (so concluding, partly on the basis of the belief “that the discovery procedures in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedures seek to further the interests of justice by minimizing surprise at trial and ensuring
wide-ranging discovery of information”).
50. Balk, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 156.
51. Sandifur, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89428, at *13, 2006 WL 3692611, at *4.
52. Sabhlok, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105194, at *11, 2009 WL 3561523, at *4.
53. Sandifur, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89428, at *13, 2006 WL 3692611, at *4.
54. Id.
55. Safar v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 1:15cv469, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52404, at *5, 2016
WL 1589600, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2016) (citing Balk, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 156).
56. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opp. Comm’n v. Global Horizons, Inc., No. 11-00257 DAE-RLP, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33346, at *15–16, 2012 WL 874868, at *5 (D. Haw. Mar. 13, 2012).
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1)(A)–(B).
58. State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Cty. of Camden, Civ. No. 08-5128 (NLH) (AMD), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 65142, at *7–8, 2010 WL 2719810, at *2 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010).
59. Edelman v. Taittinger (In re Edelman), 295 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2002); see also, e.g.,
M’Baye v. N.J. Sports Prod., Inc., 246 F.R.D. 205, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting case and emphasizing
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in accordance with the Rules, and the serving party must always pay any
witness’ travel costs, as calculated by the relevant tribunal.60 Lastly, as
courts have overwhelmingly ruled, “[t]he only people who cannot be
served under . . . [this statute] are foreign nationals residing in a foreign
country.”61
3. Limits on Distant Depositions: Rule 28
If a deposition is to be held abroad, whether physically or via
teleconference, Rule 28(b) must be consulted.62 In accordance with its
language, a deposition in a foreign court will only be permitted (1)
“under a treaty or convention,” (2) “under a letter of request, whether or
not captioned a ‘letter of rogatory,’” (3) “on notice, before a person
authorized to administer oaths either by federal law or by the law in the
place of examination,” or finally (4) “before a person commissioned by
the court to administer any necessary oath and take testimony.” 63 The
burden for getting such an order lies upon the party opposing the
location selected by another or preferred by a court.64 For this very
reason, one court admonished a party for “mak[ing] no attempt to
analyze which, if any, of the circumstances [enumerated in Rule 28(b)]
is applicable” and thereupon denied without prejudice a motion to
depose by videoconference under Rule 30, a denial to be reconsidered if
the requesting party would “supplement its request with proposed
procedures that would ensure that the requirements of Rule 28(b) . . .
[can be] satisfied.”65 Before allowing or ordering a deposition to be
hosted abroad to occur pursuant to Rule 28, courts focus on a variety of
“logistical” factors, regularly compelling the party whose witness is to
be deposed to (1) provide documentation that the foreign nation’s
government permits such depositions to proceed on its own soil or does
not expressly foreclose their conduct; (2) identify and secure one or
more officials who are authorized to administer an oath at the
prospective location; (3) set forth dates, times, and locations of any
the plain language of Rule 45).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1783(b).
61. NML Capital Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., No. 2:14-cv-492-RFB-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
110625, at *29, 2014 WL 3898021, at *9 (D. Nev. Aug. 11, 2014) (citing, among others, Relational,
LLC v. Hodges, 627 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Drogoul, 1 F.3d 1546, 1553
(11th Cir. 1993)).
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 28(b); Zassenhaus v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 404 F.2d 1361, 1362 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 28(b)(1)(A)–(D); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d
1134, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
64. See Fausto v. Credigy Servs. Corp., 251 F.R.D. 427, 430–31 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
65. Menovcik v. BASF Corp., No. 09-12096, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123858, at *12, *15–16,
2010 WL 4867408, at *4, *5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 23, 2010).
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foreign deposition promptly; (4) arrange high-resolution cameras/videos
offering a full view of both the deponent and his or her immediate
surroundings if the deposition is to be taken via live video; and/or (5)
identify any and all interpreters, stenographers, and, if necessary,
videographers to be involved.66
4. Discovery’s Purpose: Rules 1 and 26
The Rules’ first paragraph delineates their scope and purpose, thus
influencing the interpretation of every other rule—and much of the
judiciary’s treatment of any procedural ambiguity.
Pursuant to its first sentence, “the [R]ules govern the procedure in all
civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts, except
as stated in Rule 81.”67 Rule 1’s second independent clause sets out the
three principles intended to guide every rule’s construction: “[The
Rules] should be construed, administered, and employed by the court
and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.”68 In 1993, the advisory committee
added “and administered” so as to “to recognize the affirmative duty of
the court to exercise the authority conferred by the[ R]ules to ensure that
civil litigation is resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost or
delay.”69 Attorneys “share this responsibility with the judge to whom the
case is assigned,” and even the most partisan lawyer must not forget that
“[e]ffective advocacy is consistent with—and indeed depends upon—
cooperative and proportional use of procedure.”70 The addition of
“employed” on December 1, 2015, extended this obligation to one final
group—the parties themselves.71 As such, every rule, including Rules 28
and 30, must be construed in a manner most likely to ensure realization
of the three virtues—justice, speed, and efficiency—consecrated in Rule
1.72
66. United States v. Cordoba, No. 12-20157-CR-ROSENBAUM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46804,
at *11–12, 2013 WL 1325302, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2013) (listing these conditions).
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; United States v. Perez, 752 F.3d 398, 404 (4th Cir. 2014).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; see also, e.g., In re Cooper
Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1188 (10th Cir. 2009).
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; Paul v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:14-cv-1382, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143935, at *11–12, 2015 WL 6134104, at *4
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2015); Navico, Inc. v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., No. 14-cv-303-CVE-TLW, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 160036, at *15, 2015 WL 7721218, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 30, 2015).
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
72. See, e.g., Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. U.S. Distilled Prods. Co., 952 F.2d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (“Rule 1 sets the policy for construing all of these rules.”); United States v. Hoffa, 497 F.2d 294,
296 (7th Cir. 1974) (“All of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)
relating to costs, must be interpreted in light of Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.”); Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d
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Establishing the Rules’ “pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism,”73
two subsections relevant to Rule 30’s explication appear in Rule 26.
Above all, Rule 26(b)(1) promulgates discovery’s uniquely minimalistic
relevance standard: “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense,”
with a court empowered to order “discovery of any matter relevant to
the subject matter involved in the action” upon a showing of “good
cause.”74 At the same time, Rule 26(b)(1) obviates any link between
relevance for purposes of discovery and admissibility and thus impliedly
bars the derivation of any such conflated standard: “[i]nformation within
this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be
discoverable.”75 As drafted and construed, Rule 26(b)(1)’s
discoverability criteria do (and should) influence the location of all
depositions.76 In its current form, moreover, Rule 26(b)(1) does one
thing more. Simply put, it subjects “[a]ll discovery” to limitations
imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).77 Any evidentiary material’s
discoverability therefore depends upon its “proportional[ity] to the needs
of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the
action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant
information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”78 Due to this reconfiguration,
several constraints—(1) “the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive”; (2) “the
124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964) (“[T]he Rules were intended to embody a unitary concept of efficient and
meaningful judicial procedure, and that no single Rule can consequently be considered in a vacuum.”);
cf. Amir Shachmurove, Sovereign Speech in Troubled Times: Prosecutorial Statements as Extrajudicial
Admissions, 86 TENN. L REV. 401, 427–31 (2019) (discussing these values’ roles beyond just the Rules’
purview).
73. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500, 67 S. Ct. 385, 392, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947).
74. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Parnon
Energy, Inc., 593 F. App’x 32, 36 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Relevance to the subject matter under Rule 26 is
construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter
that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 2389, 57 L. Ed. 2d 253 (1978))).
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Anderson v. Marsh, No. 1:14-cv-01599-TLN-SAB, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 169071, at *3, 2015 WL 9179361, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2015) (citing new rule).
76. Bell v. Bd. of Educ., 225 F.R.D. 186, 193 (S.D. W. Va. 2004); cf., e.g., Credit Lyonnais, S.A.
v. SGC Int’l, Inc., 160 F.3d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The rules for depositions and discovery are to be
accorded a broad and liberal treatment”); Pucket v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 23-2, 239 F.R.D. 572,
579–80 (D.S.D. 2006) (invoking Rule in analysis of Federal Rule of Evidence 501).
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also, e.g., Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 49 F. Supp. 3d
545, 562 (N.D. Iowa 2014); Colaco v. ASIC Advantage Simplified Pension Plan, 301 F.R.D. 431, 434
n.21 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Booth v. City of Dallas, No. 3:15-cv-2435-P, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 169225, at *4, 2015 WL 9259060, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2015) (quoting new rule).
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party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the
information by discovery in the action”; or (3) “the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues”79—merit careful consideration if a
potential deponent chooses to contest a deposition notice or subpoena.80
Even absent such evidenced opposition, courts may invoke Rule
26(b)(2)(C) sua sponte,81 an analysis necessarily incorporating Rule
26(b)(1)’s two standards.82
One more paragraph enjoys a starring role in the judicial struggles
over the pegging of a prospective deposition’s appropriate location.
Specifically, Rule 26(c) vests a court with the prerogative to issue an
order, “for good cause,” protecting a “party or person” from
“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”83
Relying upon this subparagraph, multiple jurists have maintained that
“[a] district court has wide discretion to establish the time and place of
depositions.”84 After all, this rule provides for protective orders
precisely so as to circumscribe “‘the extensive intrusion into the affairs
of both litigants and third parties’ that is both permissible and common
in modern discovery.”85 Recent amendments to the Rules, all animated
by a desire to place some definite limits on sprawling discovery, only
underscore the judiciary’s obligation to diligently, albeit reasonably,
exercise the discretion already afforded by Rule 26(b) and (c).

79. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C); Surles v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir.
2007).
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), 30(d)(3)(B); see also, e.g., Kiln Underwriting, Ltd. v. Jesuit High
Sch. of New Orleans, Nos. 05-04350, 06-05060, 06-05057, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83535, at *4–6,
2008 WL 4286491, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 18, 2008).
81. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (requiring a court to “limit the frequency or extent of discovery”
whether on “motion or on its own”); Rich v. Shrader, No. 09-CV-0652-AJB (BGS), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 98184, at *15, 2013 WL 3710806, at *5 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 2013).
82. See Charvat v. Travel Servs., No. 12-cv-05746, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81770, at *7, 2015
WL 3917046, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2015) (contending that, in part due to Rule 26(b)(2)(C), “a court
is not merely permitted to limit discovery of information it finds to be irrelevant, [as defined in Rule
26(b)(1)], it is required to do so”).
83. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (emphasis added); Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1067 (7th Cir.
2009).
84. Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1994); see also, e.g., SEC v. Banc de
Binary, No. 2:13-CV-993-RCJ-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34373, at *8, 2014 WL 1030862, at *3 (D.
Nev. Mar. 14, 2014); Turner v. Prudential Ins. Co., 119 F.R.D. 381, 383 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Leist v.
Union Oil Co., 82 F.R.D. 203, 204 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
85. Bond, 585 F.3d at 1067 (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 30, 104 S. Ct.
2199, 2206, 81 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1984)).
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5. Summary: Deriving Guidance from the Rules’ Written Commands
Having wandered through a textual thicket, two conclusions can be
distilled. First, the prohibition in Rule 26(c) and the limitation set forth
in Rule 45(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B) serve to delimitate any federal court’s
authority to compel depositions of out-of-state witnesses in practice, if
not by rule.86 Indeed, though it does not appear in the written text of
Rule 30, the requirements embedded in Rule 45(c)(1) have tellingly
been extended to noticed depositions, with courts utilizing Rules 1 and
26(c) as the gateways. Conversely, some tribunals have dispensed with
it when the particular request appears meritorious, a sufficient nexus
exists, the judicial process has already been disrupted, and a stipulation
to mitigate costs has been entered.87 Second, while notice that complies
with Rule 30(a)(1) will suffice per Rule 28(b)(1)(C), before a court
orders the holding of a foreign deposition pursuant to the latter, it will
need to ascertain whether one of the four conditions in Rule 28(b)(1) can
be satisfied and whether another nation-state’s law even permits the
holding of a deposition authorized by a United States tribunal on its own
soil, a question that may (or may not) depend upon the citizenship of the
potential deponent.
C. Mutually Hostile Presumptions
In addition to the foregoing restrictions, a rebuttable presumption has
gained a foothold, its imprint now contracting, over the last twenty-five
years. As one court précised it, “a corporation’s deposition should be
taken at the corporation’s [principal] place of business.”88 Formally,
though this principle extends to officers, directors, and managing agents
of that corporation,89 much case law hints at a broader application. To
wit, for countless courts, any defendant, natural or artificial, must be
examined at his residence or place of business or employment unless
this presumption has been decidedly rebutted.90 As logic foretells,
“[w]hen a foreign defendant is involved, this presumption may be even

86. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c), 45(c)(1)(A)–(B); In re Guthrie, 733 F.2d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 1984).
87. NML Capital Ltd. v. Rep. of Arg., No. 2:14-cv-492-RFB-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
110625, at *37, 2014 WL 3898021, at *12 (D. Nev. Aug. 11, 2014).
88. Banc de Binary, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34373, at *8–9, 2014 WL 1030862, at *3; accord,
e.g., St. Hillaire & Assocs. v. F.D.I.C., Civ. No. 92-511-SD, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14839, at *3–4,
1994 WL 575773, at *2 (D.N.H. Oct. 13, 1994); Mill-Run Tours, Inc. v. Khashoggi, 124 F.R.D. 547,
550 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
89. Armsey v. Medshares Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 569, 571 (W.D. Va. 1998).
90. E.g., Fausto v. Credigy Servs. Corp., 251 F.R.D. 427, 429 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Farquhar v.
Shelden, 116 F.R.D. 70, 72 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
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stronger.”91 Accordingly, subject to only extraordinary circumstances,
not just corporate designees but any defendant can only be deposed at
either his or her employer’s principal place of business or established
residence,92 this rule trumpeting plaintiff’s normally unfettered right to
pick a deposition’s location.
Whatever the setting, this axiom is based on “the concept that it is the
plaintiffs who bring the lawsuit and who exercise the first choice as to
the forum” and “[t]he defendants, on the other hand, are not before the
court by choice.”93 As the Court itself has warned, “American courts, in
supervising pretrial proceedings, should exercise special vigilance to
protect foreign litigants from the danger that unnecessary, or unduly
burdensome, discovery may place them in a disadvantageous position,”
with judges expected to pay “the most careful consideration” of
“objections to ‘abusive’ discovery” and to acknowledge “the special
demands of comity” when dealing with “a foreign litigant on account of
its nationality or the location of its operations.”94 Notably, much ink has
been spilled over the extent of this “general proposition.”95
Complicating matters, a countervailing tendency can be glimpsed
within a hodgepodge of cases, as corporate defendants are, in fact,
commonly deposed in places other than the location of the principal
place of business, especially in the forum where the action is pending.96
Mostly, courts give two justifications for this increasingly common
approach: (1) “the convenience of all parties” and (2) “the general
interests of judicial economy.” 97 Another concern—“[i]f a federal court
91. Banc de Binary, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34373, at *9, 2014 WL 1030862, at *3 (relying on
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 546, 107
S. Ct. 2542, 2556, 96 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1987)).
92. Fausto, 251 F.R.D. at 429; see also, e.g., Fernandez v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P., No.
2:12-cv-00295-JCM-GWF, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14786, at *4, 2013 WL 438669, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb.
1, 2013) (citing Fausto, 251 F.R.D. at 429).
93. Doe v. Karadzic, Nos. 93 Civ. 878, 93 Civ. 1163, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073, at *9, 1997
WL 45515, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Farquhar, 116
F.R.D. at 72).
94. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.
95. Doe, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073, at *8, 1997 WL 45515, at *3; see also, e.g., Fed. Deposit
Ins. Co. v. La Antillana, S.A., No. 88 Civ. 2670, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13246, at *2–4, 1990 WL
155727, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1990); Deep S. Oil Co. of Tex. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 21 F.R.D. 340,
342 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
96. United States v. One Gulfstream G-V Jet Displaying Tail No. VPCES, 304 F.R.D. 10, 14
(D.D.C. 2014); Trs. of the Local 813 Ins. Tr. Fund v. Indus. Recycling Sys., Inc., No. 12-CV-1522,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167566, at *5, 2013 WL 6178579, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2013); Glatt v. Fox
Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6784(WHP), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80905, at *10–11, 2012 WL
2108220, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2012); see also, e.g., Toyota Motor Corp. v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cty.,
130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131, 146–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that “foreign corporation[s][’] agents are
frequently compelled for deposition on American soil” under federal law and that “[v]arious state courts
likewise have ordered foreign nationals to attend depositions in this country”).
97. Sugarhill Records Ltd. v. Motown Record Corp., 105 F.R.D. 166, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), cited
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compels discovery on foreign soil, foreign judicial sovereignty may be
infringed, but when depositions of foreign nationals are taken on
American or neutral soil . . . comity concerns are not implicated”—has
also been cited as a defense.98 For these very reasons, a foreign
corporation subject to a United States court’s in personam jurisdiction
can be—and have been—ordered under Rule 30(b)(6) to produce its
officers, directors, or managing agents in the United States to give
deposition testimony.99 In such situations, federal courts almost
invariably select an American city, i.e. Washington or New York for
European deponents.100
In short, in the case of a corporation’s deposition under Rule 30(b)(6),
two presumptions, subject to endless adjustments, persist. Often cited, of
course, is the “presumption” that the deposition of a corporation’s
agents and officers should ordinarily be taken at the company’s principal
place of business.101 When the corporation is a defendant, this
postulate’s cogency only grows.102 In line with this understanding, as
much case law declares, good cause for a protective order cannot be
established simply by arguing that it would be burdensome to travel to a
foreign country and/or because the deponent is a busy executive.103 In
truth, however, federal courts actually accord “varying degrees of
deference” to this so-called “presumption.”104 As one explained, it can
be readily overcome by showing that “peculiar” circumstances favor
depositions at a different location or factors of cost, convenience, and
litigation efficiency favor holding the deposition outside of the witness’
district.105 The presumption loses further force in cases where a plaintiff

in Custom Form Mfg., Inc. v. Omron Corp., 196 F.R.D. 333, 338 (N.D. Ind. 2000).
98. In re Honda Am. Motor Co., Inc. Dealership Relations Litig., 168 F.R.D. 535, 538 (D. Md.
1996) (citing numerous cases, including In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 608 n.13 (5th Cir.
1985)).
99. Custom Form Mfg., Inc., 196 F.R.D. at 336 (collecting cases, including In re Honda Am.
Motor Co., Inc. Dealership Relations Litig., 168 F.R.D. at 541–42; M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GMBH
& Co., 165 F.R.D. 65, 68 (E.D. Mich. 1996); and Roberts v. Heim, 130 F.R.D. 430, 439–40 (N.D. Cal.
1990)); Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45, 52 (D.D.C. 1985) (emphasis added).
100. See SEC v. Banc de Binary, No. 2:13-CV-993-RCJ-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34373, at
*13–30, 2014 WL 1030862, at *4–8 (D. Nev. Mar. 14, 2014); New Medium Techs. LLC v. Barco N.V.,
242 F.R.D. 460, 469 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
101. Magnus Elecs., Inc. v. Masco Corp. of Ind., 871 F.2d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 1989); Chris-Craft
Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Kuraray Co., Ltd., 184 F.R.D. 605, 607 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
102. Zuckert v. Berkliff Corp., 96 F.R.D. 161, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
103. E.g., Motion Games, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., No. 6:12-cv-878-JDL, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 147853, at *13, 2014 WL 5306961, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2014); Invensas Corp. v. Renesas
Elecs. Corp., No. CA 11-448-GMS-CJB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92455, at *10, 2012 WL 2501106, at
*3–4 (D. Del. June 27, 2012).
104. New Medium Techs., LLC, 242 F.R.D. at 466.
105. Six W. Retail Acquisition v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., 203 F.R.D. 98, 107 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); see also, e.g., Doe, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073, at *10–11, 1997 WL 45515, at *3–4.
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chose the relevant forum as a result of unavoidable and strict
constraints.106 And “[w]here the factual premise is attenuated, the
presumption is weakest.”107 Riddled with such exceptions, the
“presumption” that a defendant or non-party witness will be deposed in
the district where the deponent resides or has a principal place of
business has been described as “the antithesis of [one].”108
D. Regnant Tests
If “no place . . . appears convenient for the parties,” the deposition’s
location must be decided.109 Axiomatically, courts have wide discretion
in determining the appropriate place and may attach any number of
conditions, including payment of expenses.110 When making the
foregoing determinations, courts attempt to ascertain whether
“circumstances exist distinguishing the [present] case from the ordinary
run of civil cases.”111 Typically, these tribunals employ the five-factor
test famously limned in Cadent Ltd. v. 3M Unitek Corp.: “(1) the
location of counsel for the parties in the forum district; (2) the number
of corporate representatives a party is seeking to depose; (3) the
likelihood of significant discovery disputes arising which would
necessitate resolution by the forum court; (4) whether the persons sought
to be deposed often engage in travel for business purposes; and (5) the
equities with regard to the nature of the claim and the parties’
relationship.”112 Separately from and additionally to this quintet, courts
tend to weigh (6) its own “ability to supervise depositions and resolve
discovery dispute[s],”113 and (7) “whether the [proposed] deposition
would be impeded by the foreign nation’s laws or would affront the
nation’s judicial sovereignty,” 114 an analysis substantively identical to

106. Devlin v. Transp. Commc’ns Int’l Union, Nos. 95 Civ. 0742 (JFK) (JCF), 95 Civ. 10838
(JFK) (JCF), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 264, at *8–9, 2000 WL 28173, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2000).
107. Mill-Run Tours, Inc. v. Khashoggi, 124 F.R.D. 547, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
108. New Medium Techs., LLC, 242 F.R.D. at 466.
109. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S.
522, 546, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2556, 96 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1987).
110. Sacramento E.D.M., Inc. v. Hynes Aviation Indus., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-0288 MCE KJN, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126922, at *2–3, 2014 WL 4471419, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2014) (collecting
cases).
111. In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 267 F.R.D. 466, 472 (E.D. Va. 2010).
112. 232 F.R.D. 625, 629 (C.D. Cal. 2005); accord, e.g., Banc de Binary, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34373, at *10 & n.8, 2014 WL 1030862, at *3 & n.8 (describing the Cadent factors as the default rule in
the Ninth Circuit and noting that other circuits use similar tests); Armsey v. Medshares Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc., 184 F.R.D. 569, 571 (W.D. Va. 1998) (citing the same five factors, occasionally branded the
“Armsey factors”).
113. Afram Exp. Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1365 (7th Cir. 1985).
114. Custom Form Mfg., Inc. v. Omron Corp., 196 F.R.D. 333, 336 (N.D. Ind. 2000).
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that impliedly mandated by Rule 28(b).
Relevant to the Cadent test and its iterations is Rule 30: “[t]he parties
may stipulate—or the court may on motion order—that a deposition be
taken by telephone or other remote means,”115 with the Rule read to
mean that a deposition is “taken” where the deponent is physically
located regardless of the means by which he or she is being queried—as
well as a federal court’s power to authorize use of alternate discovery
methods, “such as the use of written questions,” so as to minimize any
number of difficulties.116 Thus, courts have repeatedly ordered
individuals located abroad to be deposed by video conference under
Rule 30,117 partly impelled by the Cadent tests’ stress on circumstantial
equities and driven by the desire to encourage parties to make use of
technology to limit costs whenever feasible.118 With just as much
unflagging faithfulness, they have made clear that the constrictions
applicable under Rule 28(b) must still be adhered if the deponent is
located outside the specific forum.119
E. Distillation
As noted above, Rule 30, particularly paragraph (a)(1), sets forth the
governing standard for fixing a deposition’s site. Notably, “[t]he
deponent’s attendance may be compelled by subpoena under Rule 45,”
whether or not the deponent is a party. 120 However, “[a] deposition
notice is all that is needed to require the attendance of parties at their
depositions.”121 In contrast, a subpoena must only be “served on a nonparty to compel attendance at the taking of a deposition.”122 Admittedly,
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(4).
116. Wis. Real Estate Inv. Tr. v. Weinstein, 530 F. Supp. 1249, 1254 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
117. See, e.g., Yowie N. Am., Inc., No. 13-CV-1906 BEN (JMA), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
163127, at *6, 2013 WL 6061945, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) (citing cases so ordering); United
States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 99-2496, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24551, 2004 WL 3253681
(D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004); UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 31, 2006 WL
375433 (Del. Chanc. Feb. 9, 2006).
118. See Guillen v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 10-05825, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97966, at *2, 2011
WL 3939690, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011).
119. See, e.g., Angamarca v. Da Ciro, Inc., 303 F.R.D. 445, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Am. Nat’l Fire
Ins. Co. v. Mirasco, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 240, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
120. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1).
121. United States v. $ 160,066.98 from Bank of Am., 202 F.R.D. 624, 627 (S.D. Cal. 2001); see
also, e.g., Calderon v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 629, 631 (D. Idaho 2012) (“It is, of
course, black letter law that only a party to a lawsuit may be deposed pursuant to notice as opposed to
subpoena.”).
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s note to 1971 amendment (emphasis added); see
also, e.g., Lehman v. Kornblau, 206 F.R.D. 345, (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Discovery of non-parties must be
conducted by subpoena pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, not the rules governing discovery of parties.”); cf.
Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 636 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (concluding that once a non-party is
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Rule 45, expressly applicable only if subpoenas must be or are actually
used, contains the 100-mile limitation.123 Despite this fact, however,
courts have used the 100-mile limitation in evaluating where a
deposition of a non-party should be located, frequently construing
anything more than 100 miles to be a “substantial burden” that
reinforces the classic presumptions précised below. More significantly,
Rule 26(c)(2) and the Cadent factors, numbering anywhere from four to
seven124 or even eight,125 can be, and have been, invoked to modify
these same presumption(s).126 Perhaps unsurprisingly, “[c]ost
considerations related to the location of depositions” should be “viewed
through at least two lenses: the relative ability of the parties to bear the
expense of depositions in a given location, and the effect that the choice
of location will have upon the total costs of litigation.”127 In the end, a
court128 “must consider each case on its own facts and the equities of the
particular situation,”129 and always retains “wide discretion to establish
the time and place of depositions”130 in the interest of justice and
procedural equity.131 Regardless, court and party would be well-served
by beginning with the checklists included in this article’s appendix,
matched to both the relevant rules and the regnant precedent.
III. CONCLUSION
In legal and colloquial discourse, words like “reasonable” and
served in accordance with Rule 45, it is under the same obligation that would be conferred on a party to
whom request is addressed pursuant to Rule 30).
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(C)(1)(A).
124. Sacramento E.D.M., Inc. v. Hynes Aviation Indus., No. 2:13-cv-0288 MCE KJN, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 126922, at *4, 2014 WL 4471419, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2014); see also, e.g., Clean
Air Council v. Dragon Int’l Grp., No. 1:CV-06-0430, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89565, at *3–4, 2007 WL
4276532, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2007) (identifying many factors, though emphasizing the significance
of “hardship to the parties”).
125. In re Honda Am. Motor Co., Inc. Dealership Relations Litig., 168 F.R.D. 535, 538 (D. Md.
1996).
126. E.g., Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. NovaStar Fin., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31-32 (D.
D.C. 2009); Turner v. Prudential Ins. Co., 119 F.R.D. 381, 383 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
127. Dagen v. CFC Grp. Holdings Ltd., No. 00 Civ. 5682 (CBM), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13859,
at *8, 2003 WL 21910861, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2003).
128. Logically, this case law draws no distinction between magistrate and district court judges. S.
Seas Catamaran, Inc. v. The Motor Vessel “Leeway”, 120 F.R.D. 17, 21 (D.N.J. 1988).
129. Turner, 119 F.R.D. at 383.
130. Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1994).
131. See Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 347, 54 S. Ct. 735, 737, 78 L. Ed. 1298 (1934)
(observing that the traditional powers of the courts at equity, as codified in Rule 27(a), date from even
before the adoption of the Constitution); cf. In re Standard Metals Corp., 817 F.2d 625, 628 (10th Cir.
1987) (“The trial court has great discretion in establishing the time and place of a deposition.”); Custom
Form Mfg., Inc. v. Omron Corp., 196 F.R.D. 333, 336 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (quoting In re Standard Metals
Corp., 817 F.2d at 628).
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“cause” imply an award of discretion. Where little definitive direction
jumps from the pertinent texts, and courts must instead rely on
contextual extrapolation, that freedom increases exponentially. Within
the world of federal procedure, the complicated calculus involved in
determining the situs of any deposition is but one more demonstration of
this old truth. Of course, where a deponent opts not to contest another’s
choice, a party’s pick poses no problems, but where objection is lodged,
parties and courts alike must wander into a wild terrain. There, the Rules
give some aid; there, presumptions duel; there, such fluid phrases as
“cost, convenience, and litigation efficiency” get tossed around, jumping
from motion to motion and from decision to decision, like demented
ions. That some coherence can be artificially concocted by diligent
readers does not change the threats to clarity and certainty posed by illdefined rules and sloppy ratiocination. Perhaps, then, the time has come
to finally input a definite standard for this unmathematical assay into
Rule 30(b)’s sphinxlike decree, one akin to that now encoded in Rule
26(b)(1). Otherwise, bitter controversy will continue, and discretion, for
good and ill, will litter this peculiarly vacant procedural field with
almost surely incompatible curiosities.132 While Congress may have
“given the responsibilities for filling in the details of common law
statutes” to the courts,133 such vacuums can sometimes undermine the
law’s very quiddity.134

132. Indeed, even if globalization’s allure has waned, to allow this emptiness to continue is to
invite far more risks to international comity and procedural coherence than a definite touchstone would
foster. Cf. Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Cases, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 294 (1993) (describing the dangers of certain discretionary terms to the
predictability of bankruptcy jurisprudence).
133. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1377–78
(1988).
134. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (“Stability and
predictability are essential factors in the proper operation of the rule of law.”); cf. Jerome B. Grubart,
Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547, 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1055, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1024
(1995) (rejecting a complex test that would “jettison[] relative predictability for the open-ended roughand-tumble of factors that assures complex argument[s] in [the] trial court and . . . virtually inevitable
appeal” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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V. APPENDIX
Yes/No
1

_____

Characteristics
of Potential
Deponent
(a) Party . . .
who . . .

_____

(b) lives less
100 miles from
forum court . . .

_____

(c) over which
personal
jurisdiction
does exist; and

_____

(d) who is a
natural person.

Presumptive Location of Deposition
Different presumptions apply depending on
whether the deponent party is a plaintiff or a
defendant. Generally, a natural plaintiff must
make
himself/herself
available
for
examination in the forum in which the suit
was brought.135 Conversely, an initial
presumption exists that a natural defendant
should be deposed in the district of his
residence or principal place of business.136
Eminent good sense underlies these dueling
presumptions: “[b]ecause the plaintiff often
chooses the forum, he will more likely be
required to attend his deposition when set in
the forum district,” but “[a] defendant . . . does
not choose the forum.”137
However, where the forum court has
jurisdiction and the potential deponent is a
party to the action and resides in the forum,
the examining party is often free to
“unilaterally choose a deposition’s location,”

135. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., No. C98-3477-CRB (JCS), 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23428, at *27, 1999 WL 33292943, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept 17, 1999); accord Masterobjects, Inc.
v. eBay, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-680 JSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118943, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug 21, 2013); see
also, e.g., Yaskawa Elec. Corp. v. Kollmorgen Corp., 201 F.R.D. 443, 444 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (observing
that “in the absence of compelling circumstances or extreme hardship, a plaintiff should appear for a
deposition in the forum of his choice--even if he is a nonresident.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Orrison v. The Balcor Co., 132 F.R.D. 202, 203 (N.D. Ill. 1990)); S. Seas Catamaran, Inc. v. The
Motor Vessel “Leeway”, 120 F.R.D. 17, 21 (D.N.J. 1988) (noting this “general rule”).
136. Fausto v. Credify Servs. Corp., 251 F.R.D. 427, 429 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (relying on Doe v.
Karadzic, Nos. 93 Civ. 878 (PKL) (HBP), 93 Civ. 1163 (PKL) (HBP), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073, at
*8–9, 1997 WL 45515, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1997)); accord, e.g., Thykkuttathil v. Keese, No. C121749RSM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120426, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2013); Willis v. Mullins, No.
CV-F-04-6542 AWI LJO, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35627, at *16, 2006 WL 302343, * 5-6 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 8, 2006) (citing to Grey v. Cont’l Mktg. Assocs., 315 F. Supp. 826, 832 (N.D. Ga. 1970)));
Mothersbaugh v. GTX, Inc., No 89-1202-FR, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4022, at *2, 1990 WL 47389, at
*1 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 1990); Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. La Antillana, S.A., No. 88 Civ. 2670 (JFK), 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13246, 1990 WL 155727 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1990).
137. Turner v. Prudential Ins. Co., 119 F.R.D. 381, 383 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
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Presumptive Location of Deposition
subject only to the constraints imposed by
Rule 26.138

2

_____

(a) Party . . .
which

In sum, then, if conditions (a) through (d)
hold, neither of the two presumptions summed
here come into play, for the examining party’s
right to choose the deposition’s location can
never be too inconvenient (etc.) for a party
that is a natural person who lives less than 100
miles from the forum court.
The same presumptions discussed in Row #1
as to the officers, directors, or managing
agents139 to be deposed pursuant to Rule
30(b)(1) and (b)(6) of a corporation. In other
words, “[t]he deposition of a corporation by its

138. Cadent Ltd. v. 3M Unitek Corp., 232 F.R.D. 625, 628 (C.D. Cal. 2005); accord, e.g., Reishus
v. Almaraz, No. CV-10-0760-PHX-LOA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21113, at *8–9, 2011 WL 676920, at
*3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2011); United States v. $160,066.98 from Bank of Am., 202 F.R.D. 624, 627 (S.D.
Cal. 2001).
139. Per the relevant rule’s text, this presumption extends only to directors, officers, and
managing agents. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6). However, because a corporation served under Rule 30(b)(6)
can itself designate an agent to be deposed if the other party’s request is not specific as to person and
title, non-managing but expressly designated agents are occasionally treated like officers, directors, and
their managing brethren, as this article has already adduced. See supra Part II.C; Couch v. Harmony Sci.
Acad. – El Paso, No. EP08-CA-201-FM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51085, at *14, 2009 WL 10669392, at
*4–5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2009) (denying defendants’ request to dictate the location of the individual
they had designated to respond to the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition as defendants’ because “the organization
noticed for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition is a party and not a non-party” (emphasis in original)); FED. R.
CIV. P. 30(b)(6) (“The named organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or
managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf . . . .”). With the caveat
that the term “managing agent” is itself nebulous and elastic, the narrow interpretation appears the more
appropriate. See, e.g., Richmond v. Mission Bank, No. 1:14-cv-0184-JLT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48452, at *27, 2015 WL 1637835, at *11–12 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2015).
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Presumptive Location of Deposition
agents and officers should ordinarily be taken
at its principal place of business.”140 Equally
true, the deposing party has great freedom to
choose the deposition’s location if conditions
(a) through (d) hold true. If the deponent is not
a director, officer, managing agent, however,
the deponent is treated as a non-party.141 For
the presumption applicable to such witnesses,
see Row 7 through 10.

*** Only difference between (1) and (2) is (d). ***

140. Cadent, 232 F.R.D. at 628 (citing 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2112 (2d ed. rev. 1994)); accord, e.g., Calderon v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc.,
287 F.R.D. 629, 636 (D. Idaho 2012) (citing In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 267 F.R.D. 466, 473 (E.D.
Va. 2010), and E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 268 F.R.D. 45, 54–55 (E.D. Va. 2010));
Hardin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-CV-0617 AWI BAM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138892, at *13–
14, 2011 WL 11563217, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011); Strategic Intent, LLC v. Strangofrd Lough
Brewing Co. Ltd., No. CV-09-309-RHW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69131, at *6, 2010 WL 2486365, at
*2 (E.D. Wash. June 16, 2010); Dean Foods Co. v. Eastman Chem. Co., Nos. C 00-4379 WHO, C 004402 WHO (JL), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25447, at *14–16 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2001).
141. Calderon, 287 F.R.D. at 631.
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Presumptive Location of Deposition
Interestingly, personal jurisdiction does not
directly affect the previously discussed
presumptions. Indeed, in and of itself it will
not defeat operation of the aforementioned
rules of thumb.142 Instead, in the few cases
even discussing this relationship, the fact that
personal jurisdiction has been established is
cited as one of the more compelling reasons to
modify these presumptions.143 To wit, the
presumptions detailed in Rows 1 and 2 operate
regardless of personal jurisdiction.144 Its
presence or absence, of course, may factor into
the balancing test required by Cadent and its
progeny.

142. Sloniger v. Deja, No. 09CV858S, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134414, at *26–28, 2010 WL
5343184, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2010) (citing two non-California cases which applied variants of the
Cadent test and concluding that the existence of personal jurisdiction could not “overcome the
presumption under federal law that a non-resident defendant should be deposed in his place of
residence” absent “extraordinary circumstances”); Wallace v. Hounshel, No. 1:06-cv-1560-RLY-TAB,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6607, at *2–4, 2008 WL 282069, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 29, 2008) (alluding its
own lack of personal jurisdiction over the deponent, but not considering it as decisive, and ultimately
applying the presumption).
143. Custom Form Mfg., Inc. v. Omron Corp., 196 F.R.D. 333, 336 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (“When a
foreign corporation is doing business in the United States, is subject to the court’s jurisdiction, and has
freely taken advantage of our federal rules of discovery, exceptions to the general rule on the location of
depositions are often made.” (emphasis added) (collecting cases)); see also Metcalf v. Bay Ferries Ltd.,
No. 12-40075-TSH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98538, at *3–4, 2014 WL 3670786, at *1–2 (D. Mass. July
21, 2014) (ordering a foreign company to present its agent for deposition in Massachusetts, as plaintiffs’
counsel requested in the relevant notice); New Medium Techs. LLC v. Barco N.V., 242 F.R.D. 460, 466
(N.D. Ill. 2007) (quoting Custom Form Mfg., Inc., 196 F.R.D. at 336); I Create Int’l, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc.,
No. 03 Civ. 3993 (JFK), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15477, at *14, 2004 WL 1774250, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 9, 2004) (noting that the disparity in means which may justify transfer to a venue where personal
jurisdiction exists may impact how a court exercises its discretionary power over depositions’ location).
144. See Custom Form Mfg., Inc., 196 F.R.D. at 336.
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_____

(c) over which
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_____

(d) which is a
corporation.
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Presumptive Location of Deposition
The same analysis regarding the location of
natural parties over whom personal
jurisdiction does not exist extends to
corporations with one change. If an officer,
director, or managing agent is to be deposed,
the presumption is different than if merely an
employee is involved. The latter are treated as
non-party witnesses, for whom different
presumptions, detailed in Rows 7 through 10,
apply.

** Only difference between (3) and (4) is (d). ***
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personal
jurisdiction does
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Presumptive Location of Deposition
Within most circuits, the presumption
summarized in Row 1 is regularly invoked
here so long as a subpoena under Rule
45(c)(1) is not employed. Thus, “the rule
that the place of depositions is
presumptively where the deponent resides
applies.”145
A matter purely of degree, one difference
can be discerned: this same presumption is
even stronger when a party is so far
removed from the forum court. So
animated, as court after court within this
circuit has repeated, “[w]hen a deponent
resides at a substantial distance from the
deposing party’s residence, the deposing
party should be required to take the
deposition at a location in the vicinity in
which the deponent resides, even if the
deponent is a party.”146
Notably, whether or not “substantial
distance” is identical to “more than 100

145. Berry v. Baca, No. CV 01-02069 DDP (SHx), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15698, at *10, 2002
WL 1777412, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2002); accord $160,066.98, 202 F.R.D. at 627.
146. Gen. Leasing Co. v. Lawrence Photo-Graphic Supply, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 130, 131 (W.D. Mo.
1979) (emphasis added); see also Mothersbaugh v. GTX, Inc., No 89-1202-FR, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4022, at *2, 1990 WL 47389, at *1 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 1990) (quoting Gen. Leasing Co., 84 F.R.D. at
131)); accord, e.g., Clairmont v. Genuity, Inc., No. C02-1876L, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20784, at *2–3,
2004 WL 2287781, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2004) (quoting Metrex Res. Corp. v. United States, 151
F.R.D. 122, 125 (D. Colo. 1993)).
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natural person.

_____

(a) Party . . .
which . . .

_____
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from forum court
...
(c) over which.
personal
jurisdiction does
exist; and
(d) which is a
corporation.

_____

_____
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miles” is unclear. Nonetheless, as Rule
32(a)(4)(B) defines an unavailable witness
as one who “is more than 100 miles from
the place of hearing or trial or is outside the
United States,”147 and per the embedded
mandate of Rule 1,148 it would be logical
and reasonable to so consider it.

The same analysis in Row 5 extends to
corporations with one change. If an officer,
director, or managing agent is to be
deposed, the presumption is different than if
merely an employee is involved. The former
are subject to the same stronger-than-usual
presumption summarized in Row 5; the
latter (i.e. non- managing agents) are treated
as non-party witnesses, to whom a different
presumption applies. For the applicable
rules, see Rows 7 through 10.

*** Only difference between (5) and (6) is (d). ***

147. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(4)(B); Delgado v. Pawtucket Police Dep’t, 668 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir.
2012).
148. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964) (contending
that “the Rules were intended to embody a unitary concept of efficient and meaningful judicial
procedure, and that no single Rule can consequently be considered in a vacuum”).
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_____

Characteristics
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(a) Non-party . . .
who . . .
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Presumptive Location of Deposition
Whether or not a deponent is a party or a
non-party, the general presumption remains
the same: they ought to be deposed where
the deponent resides or has its/his/her
principal place of business.149 However,
unlike the other precepts previously
delineated, because “an ordinary non-party
witness” can only be deposed via “a
subpoena” under Rule 45, this presumption
is essentially statutory150 and delimitated by
mileage.151 Per Rule 45(c)(1)(A), a
subpoena can command a person to attend a
deposition only “within 100 miles of where
the person resides, is employed, or regularly

149. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6784(WHP), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
80905, at *11, 2012 WL 2108220, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2012) (collecting cases). A few federal
courts in California have implicitly endorsed this approach. Berry, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15698, at
*11, 2002 WL 1777412, at *3 (endorsing the general rule, which applies to parties and non-parties alike,
that “the place of depositions is presumptively where the deponent resides,” applicable “‘even if the
deponent is a party’” (emphasis added)).
150. Since the Rules have the force and effect of law, their commands can be described as
“statutory.” Morel v. Daimler-Chrysler AG, 565 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. Indymac MBS,
Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 108 n.14 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . have the force and
effect of a federal statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); SLW Capital, LLC v. Mansaray-Ruffin
(In re Mansaray-Ruffin), 530 F.3d 230, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The Rules are binding and courts must
abide by them unless there is an irreconcilable conflict with the Bankruptcy Code.”), abrogated on other
grounds, United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 176 L. Ed. 158
(2010); Shachmurove, supra note 9, at 511 n.2 (citing these and other cases).
151. Calderon v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 629, 631 (D. Idaho 2012); cf.
Symantec Corp. v. Acronis, Inc., No. 11-cv-5310 EMC (JSC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17505, at *4–5,
2013 WL 503612, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013) (opining that if a person is a non-party “[their]
deposition must be sought by third-party subpoena”).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss4/2

28

Shachmurove: Contesting Deposition Locations

2019]

CONTESTING DEPOSITION LOCATIONS

_____

Characteristics
of Potential
Deponent
(b) works/lives
less 100 miles
from forum
court.

_____
8

(a) Non-party . . .
who . . .

Yes/No

973

Presumptive Location of Deposition
transacts business.”152 In this scenario, with
the forum court being within 100 miles of
non-party’s
residence,
no
possible
deposition location within that area can
violate the rule.153
Element (b) is key here, effectively
propagating one more presumption. Quite
simply, a non-party cannot be deposed more
than “100 miles . . . [from] where the person
resides, is employed, or regularly transacts
business.”154 This strict reading of Rule 45
widely prevails.155 Numerous courts within
the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit have
followed it as well.156
Arguably, the Ninth Circuit did so as well

152. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1)(A); In re Apple, Inc., 581 F. App’x 886, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Rule
45(c)(1)(B) dispenses with the 100-mile limitation, allowing for depositions to be held “within the state
where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person,” but only so long as
that person is “a party or a party’s officer” or is being commanded “to attend a trial,” not a deposition,
“and would not [thereby] incur substantial expense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1)(B).
153. The 100-mile limitation has been criticized as archaic, particularly inappropriate in the
context of complex and multidistrict litigation. See Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 213,
221–22 (E.D. La. 2008) (collecting cases).
154. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1)(A).
155. State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Cty. of Camden, No. 08-5128(NLH)(AMD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65142, at *7, 2010 WL 2719810, at *3 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010) (“[N]umerous cases throughout the
country . . . make it clear that a court must quash any subpoena that calls for a deposition beyond the
100 mile limit for non-party witness.”); Edelman v. Taittinger (In re Edelman), 295 F.3d 171, 178 (2d
Cir. 2002). Consequently, the discretion which courts normally have about locating depositions does not
exist when Rule 45 applies, as it does regarding non-party deponents. State Nat’l Ins. Co., 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 65142, at *7, 2010 WL 2719810, at *3.
156. See, e.g., Dolezal v. Fritch, No. CV-08-1362-PHX-DGC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26238, at
*3–4, 2009 WL 764542, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 23, 2009); Mothersbaugh v. GTX, Inc., No 89-1202-FR,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4022, at *2, 1990 WL 47389, at *1 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 1990).
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more than 100
miles from forum
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Presumptive Location of Deposition
when it found it was not an abuse of
discretion for a district court, under Rule
45(d)(1), “to protect this witness from the
burden
of
traveling
overseas
for
examination” by ordering that the
deposition of a non-party witness take place
in that deponent’s domicile (Sweden).157

*** Only difference between (7) and (8) is (b). ***

157. Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir. 1981).
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The presumptions summarized in Rows 8
and 9 control. For non-parties, the 100-mile
limitation is the key factor, not the fact that
the person lives abroad, though a person’s
foreign residence will affect how service of a
subpoena can be made and whether a
deposition can even he held.158

As to Row 10, the same presumptions
summarized in Rows 8 and 9 govern here,
though they are undeniably weaker due to a
suddenly applicable statute. To summarize, if
the non-party is a United States citizen, §
1783(a) governs.
Under that statute, “[a] court of the United
States may order the issuance of a subpoena
requiring the appearance as a witness before
it, or before a person or body designated by
it, of a national or resident of the United
States who is in a foreign country.”159 Two

158. See, e.g., In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 300 (3d Cir. 2004)
(“[T]he Federal Rules are ‘the normal methods’ for federal litigation involving foreign national parties
unless the ‘optional’ or ‘supplemental’ [Hague] Convention procedures prove to be conducive to
discovery under some circumstances.”); United States v. Afram Lines, Ltd., 159 F.R.D. 408, 413
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[Non-party] witness[es] must be subpoenaed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or, if the witness is overseas, the procedures of the Hague Convention or other
applicable treaty must be utilized.”). Briefly, while the presumption as to location does not change, a
more onerous service process, lodged in Rule 4(f), must be followed. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f); Estate of
Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 412 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (2014).
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Characteristics
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abroad; and . . .
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conditions must be met before a court may
authorize a subpoena’s issuance pursuant to
this section: (a) “that particular testimony or
the production of the document or other thing
by him is necessary in the interest of justice,”
and (b) “in other than a criminal action or
proceeding, if the court finds, in addition,
that it is not possible to obtain his testimony
in admissible form without his personal
appearance . . . in any other manner.”160 The
subpoena must still be served “in accordance
with the provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure relating to service of process
on a person in a foreign country,”161 which
_____
(c) who is a
are encoded in Rule 4(f).162 While this statute
United States
technically creates no more than personal
citizen.
jurisdiction over the proposed deponent,163
three facts—(a) it allows a court to order a
US citizen to appear for a deposition; (b)
international procedures may be uncertain or
unavailable; and (c) a United States’ court’s
jurisdiction to enforce compulsion with any
subpoena evaporates outside of the United
States—weaken the normal (and here
especially) “strong presumption that foreign
defendants should be deposed at their
principal place of business or near their
residence.”164
*** Only difference between (9) and (10) is (c). ***

160. Id.
161. Id. § 1783(b).
162. However, in contrast with the service of subpoenas on non-U.S. citizens, “[t]he person
serving the subpoena shall tender to the person to whom the subpoena is addressed his estimated
necessary travel and attendance expenses.” Id.
163. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438, 52 S. Ct. 252, 255, 76 L. Ed. 375 (1929).
164. SEC v. Banc de Binary, No. 2:13-CV-993-RCJ-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34373, at *28,
2014 WL 1030862, at *9 (D. Nev. Mar. 14, 2014); SEC v. Sabhlok, No. C 08-4238 CRB (JL), 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105194, at *15–24, 2009 WL 3561523, at *6–8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009) (discussing
facts (a) through (b) and balancing the hardships in such a way as to justify ordering a foreign national
covered by § 1783 to be deposed in the United States).
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